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We study the efficiency of Community Development Loan Funds (CDLFs) in the U.S.A. 
between 2002 and 2005. We find that the largest CDLFs tend to be most efficient and 
that efficiency decreases with age and the proportion of minority representation on the 
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  11. INTRODUCTION: 
Community Development Financial Institutions also referred to as Microfinance 
Institutions, have gained popularity in the last couple of decades or so, not only in 
developing countries but also in the developed world. In Continental USA the 
Microfinance industry is quite active with an estimated 1000 registered CDFIs and the 
latest survey put the asset base of these organizations at $16.9 billion (Hartarska, 
2007).The main focus of these institutions has been to reach out to the poor, marginalized 
and excluded (unbankable) people in the society with micro credit at reasonable interest 
rates. Poor people in most countries virtually have had no access to formal financial 
services (Littlefield, Murduch and Hashemi,2003).Through these MFIs/CDFIs, such as 
the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh and others, poor people are becoming empowered 
economically (Tucker,2006).Thus, MFIs/CDFIs have become instruments of poverty 
alleviation and economic empowerment. In recent times however, issues of sustainability 
of MFIs/CDFIs have been raised by researchers. It therefore becomes necessary to 
research into the efficiency of MFIs/CDFIs to find out what factors (including internal 
characteristics) determine the efficiency and thus sustainability of CDFIs/MFIs. 
The main objective of this study was to investigate the cost efficiency and thus 
sustainability of a sample of CDFIs in the United States. Among others, the specific 
objectives include: i. Estimate the cost efficiency of each CDFI covered in the sample. 
ii.Find what internal characteristics are determinants of CDFI efficiency level. 
       In the literature, efficiency measurement dates back to Farrell (1957) when the 
foundation was laid for the measurement of efficiency and productivity at the micro level. 
Farrell decomposed efficiency into technical and allocative efficiency. The former 
  2measure of efficiency refers to a firm’s ability to minimize input use subject to producing 
a given amount of output or maximize output subject to a given level of input usage. The 
latter reflects a firm’s ability to optimize the use of inputs given their respective prices 
and the technology available for combining those inputs. These two measures sum up to 
what is known as economic or total efficiency. 
       In principle, efficiency measurement of a firm is done by comparing its observed 
inputs and outputs to a frontier level which represents the most efficient firm. In practice, 
there may not be any firm that could be described technically, as operating on the frontier 
in terms of efficiency and we do not often know where the frontier is anyway. However, 
recent improvement in econometric software does allow for the simulation of a frontier 
level firm making it possible for individual firms’ efficiency to be estimated by simple 
comparison to the frontier firm. 
       Several approaches to the estimation of efficiency have evolved over time. Two 
common approaches that are being used to study efficiency of banks and MFIs are the 
stochastic frontier (SFA) and the data envelopment approaches (DEA).The former is a 
parametric (econometric) approach while the latter is non-parametric and non-stochastic 
(deterministic). Stochastic frontiers seek to overcome the inadequacy of deterministic 
models which is that they do not account for stochastic disturbances. Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis was developed independently by Aigner et al. (1977), Battese and Corra (1977), 
Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977), and is based on an econometric specification of a 
production or cost frontier. In this case, the general stochastic frontier function estimation 
involves the specification of a disturbance term that causes deviation from the frontier by 
  3decomposing it into two error components-a symmetric error term to account for random 
noise and an asymmetric error accounting for inefficiency. 
       These two methods have been used by various researchers for the same tasks. While 
some authors say there is no difference in efficiency estimated by the two processes, 
others find varying degrees of differences in the efficiency estimates.  
        Ferrier and Lovell (1990) did a study on the cost structure of 575 US banks for the 
year 1984 in which they employed both SFA and DEA methodologies. Their estimates 
show mean efficiency to be higher for DEA than SFA at 80% and 74% respectively. 
Another study that compares SFA and DEA methodologies but incidentally, finds 
contrasting results to that of Ferrier and Lovell is Resti (1997).He analyses the cost 
efficiency of 270 Italian banks over the period 1988-1992.He compares the efficiency 
estimates via parametric and non-parametric methods with the result that reports 81%-
92% for SFA as against 60%-78% for DEA.More recent studies find SFA efficiency 
scores are generally higher than those obtained by DEA (Fiorentino et al, 2003).This may 
be due to the fact that DEA method does not control for stochastic noise in the data. This 
way, any random noise such as misspecification and measurement errors are attributed to 
inefficiency which tends to underestimate the efficiency score and overestimate the 
inefficiency. 
 
2. CHARACTERISTICS OF CDFIS 
From humble beginnings in the 1800s, CDFIs have grown steadily both in absolute 
numbers and size. As organizations with the sole mandate of providing financial services 
to low-income communities and individuals, they have lived up to expectation of 
  4expanding the frontiers of commerce in these marginalized areas. The creation of a 
Federal funding agency (CDFI FUND) to provide funds to individual CDFIs was a 
further shot in the arm. Consequently, there has been an increased scaling up in the 
operation of CDFIs benefiting from this fund. A growing industry of this nature without a 
system in place to provide the needed checks and balances could create the potential for 
financial impropriety, at least guided by the quantum of recent corporate scandals that 
rocked the American Financial Industry. A Federal Act known as Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) provides the legal framework for regulating and monitoring the 
activities of CDFIs. 
         There are four categories of CDFIs mandated by the CRA Act to operate in the 
industry-Community Development Banks (CDBs), Community Development Credit 
Unions (CDCUs), Community Development Loan Funds (CDLFs) and Community 
Development Venture Capital Funds (CDVCFs). 
         Community Development Loan Funds lend capital to businesses and nonprofit 
organizations as mandated by the law. By their activities, CDLFs pursue various goals 
such as promoting economic growth and development, creation of jobs in low-income 
areas, and increasing the number of businesses owned by women and minorities. This 
paper focuses on the internal characteristics and cost efficiency of CDLFs.There is no 
special reason for this choice other than data availability and discretion of the researcher. 
Other researchers have focused on two or more of the other CDFIs.A comparative study 
of the impact of board size and board diversity on the performance of CDCUs and 
CDLFs on the one hand, and internal and external factors affecting efficiency of MFIs on 
the other hand have already been done (Hartarska, 2007; Hartarska and Mersland, 
  52007).Using a three year panel data, Hartarska (2007) find no relationship between board 
size and performance of CDLFs and a negative association between racial and gender 
diversity and performance. This study further confirms the above findings by using four 
year panel data on CDLFs to show that board size has a negative insignificant effect on 
cost efficiency. Other studies that found similar negative association between board size 
and efficiency include Lipton and Loasch (1992) and Jensen (1993) while Belkhir (2004) 
found a positive association between board size and performance.Oster and Reagan 
(2004) explain the reason for an observed positive association between board size and 
performance. Their study focuses on the effect of board size in non-profit firms and they 
argue that the positive effect of larger board size may be justified due to additional duties 
of supervising fundraising activities. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
The cost function of a particular CDFI could be modeled as ( , ; ) ii fqpβ , where q 
represents CDFI output, p is a vector of input prices and β is a vector of coefficients. 
Assuming there is no inefficiency or errors, the cost function of the most efficient CDFI 
is given as 
Ci= f (qi, pi; β)                             3.1 
        But this is an abstraction from reality, in that inefficiency is a phenomenon that 
characterizes the operations of all firms. We need therefore to re-model the cost 
efficiency as  
Ci= f (qi, pi; β) ξ I                       3.2 
  6        Where ξ i is the level of inefficiency for the ith CDFI.Assuming that the firm 
achieves optimal level of cost at the desired output levels then ξ i=1.On the other hand if 
ξ i >1 then the firm has cost that is greater than optimal, and thus cost inefficiency is 
present in its operations. If a firm’s observed/actual cost point lies on the cost frontier 
then it is perfectly cost efficienct.But if the actual cost point lies above the cost frontier 
(which is most often the case), then it is cost inefficient. 
Costs are also assumed to be characterized by measurement errors and other random 
shocks that could lead to the observed cost deviating from actual. In this case we need to 
include a stochastic error term to cater for this noise. Thus, 
Ci= f (qi, pi; β) ξ iexp(vi)                            3.3 
Taking natural log of both sides yields 
Ln (Ci) =ln{ } ii f (q , p ;  )  β +lnξ i+ vi              3.4 
If we define ui= lnξ i and assume that ξ i≥1, we have  
                             Ln (Ci) =ln{ } ii f (q , p ;  )  β + ui + vi                              3.5 
Where ui≥0 
      This is the stochastic cost frontier. The error term is decomposed into two,vi which is 
two-sided (symmetric) and captures the effects of measurement errors and other 
disturbances outside the control of the decision taker. While ui is a one-sided 
(asymmetric) error that captures the cost inefficiency, measured as the distance of the 
observed cost from the cost frontier. The non-negativity assumption of the inefficiency 
error term agrees very well with the practical reality that inefficiency is a common 
characteristic phenomenon of all firms. 
  7        The idiosyncratic error term (vi ) is always assumed normally and independently 
distributed as   N (0,
2
v σ ). Different specifications of the distribution of ui give rise to 
different functional forms. It is assumed for the purpose of this paper, that the ui are 
independently half-normally distributed N
+(0,
2
u σ ). 
       Various functional forms have been used to model cost efficiency. In this paper, cost 




u σ ).In both equations also, the inefficiency error term enters 
as an additive term since inefficiency is expected to increase cost. 
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Where Ci is cost, qi is output and pji are input prices. 
3.1 HYPOTHESES 
The following hypotheses are formulated in order to help achieve the objectives of the 
study. 
H0: Board size is not a significant determinant of CDLF efficiency 
H0: Older CDLF are less efficient 
H0: Larger CDLF are less efficient 
H0: Boards dominated by minorities are less efficient  
  8        In order to test these hypotheses, the following model linking cost efficiency to firm 
characteristics was developed and estimated by the method of Ordinary Least Squares. 
01 2 3 4 min
n
ii i i i j
j
CE Age Bsize Ta P Controlsi i β ββ β β β =+ + + + + + ∑ ε          3.8 
Where CE is the estimated coefficient of cost efficiency of the ith firm, Age is the 
number of years the CDLF has been in operation, Bsize is the number of board members, 
Ta is the dollar value of total assets (a measure of firm size), Pmin is the share of 
minorities on the board and βj is a vector coefficients for the control variables. The error 
term  i ε  is niid (0.
2 σ ).The classical linear model assumptions hold and therefore standard 
t and F-statistics are applied to the hypotheses tests. 
 
4. DATA AND VARIABLES 
Four-year panel data on a cross section of Community Development Loan Fund 
Institutions are used in the analysis. The data was collected by the CDFI Data Project as 
part of their annual surveys of CDFIs spanning the fiscal years 2002 to 2005.The unit of 
observation is the CDLFs with complete information over the 4-year period and there are 
close to 300 of them in the sample. 
        Following is a description of relevant variables used in the analysis while table1 
gives summary statistics of each variable. Variable definitions are given in table 4. 
In order to estimate the performance of CDFI Loan Funds, a cost efficiency estimation 
approach using both translog and Cobb-Douglas functions was adopted. The dependent 
variable is natural log of total cost as in equations (3.6) and (3.7).For the purpose of this 
study and the given sample, total cost is defined to include the sum of operating and 
financial expenses incurred by the CDFI within a fiscal year.  
  9       The arguments of the translog and Cobb-Douglas cost frontier functions include 
output and input prices. The main legal function of CDFI Loan Fund Institutions is to 
advance loans to businesses. Therefore an appropriate way to measure its performance is 
to look at the number of loans produced in a given year at the minimum possible cost or 
to put it otherwise, the number of clients served while not sacrificing the sustainability of 
the firm. The sustainability issue here is an important one given that the clients served by 
these institutions are the high risk type with a higher probability of defaulting on loan 
repayment. Since these institutions do not have the legal backing to accept deposits 
and/or engage in other financial deals that CDFIs like Credit Unions are able to do, it is 
appropriate to model their cost frontier with a single output translog function. The cost 
efficiency generated from a Cobb-Douglas cost frontier does not differ, at least as 
revealed by this study. Three input prices are included in the cost frontier function 
namely labor input price, measured as the ratio of personnel emolument to total number 
of paid personnel employed by the CDFI.Volunteer services provided by unpaid 
personnel are not included in this analysis just for the purpose of simplicity. Of course 
their inclusion would not change the results since they are not paid; there is no additional 
cost to the CDFI by their employment. The price of financial capital is calculated from 
the given sample data as the weighted cost of capital, while price of physical capital is 
calculated as the ratio of the difference between operating expense and personnel expense 
to net assets. Finally, by using the price of physical capital as a numeraire, all prices and 
total cost are normalized by dividing through by the numeraire.Total cost, output and 
input prices are thus the variables that are used to estimate the efficiency of CDFIs.A 
  10parametric stochastic translog cost frontier approach is used to derive the efficiencies 
because of its flexibility and computational ease given the available software. 
CDLF characteristics that are postulated to influence efficiency include but not limited to 
the Age, board size, total assets, number of personnel, profit margin, total equity, 
capital/asset ratio etc. 
For example, Gregoire and Oswaldo (2003) did a study on the Cost Efficiency of 
Microfinance Institutions in Peru using a Stochastic Frontier Approach. Their study 
analyses the efficiency of MFIs in Peru between 1999 and 2003 through the estimation of 
a parametric stochastic cost frontier. Among others, the study finds that MFIs with the 
largest assets tend to post higher efficiency levels and that efficiency decreases as more 
MFIs enter the market. The study identifies that loan size, proportion of net assets, 
financial sufficiency, financial leverage, business experience and proportion of farm 
loans are the main factors determining the cost efficiency of MFIs. 
         Cost efficiency of each CDLF was estimated via a stochastic cost frontier using 
translog functional form. A Cobb-Douglas functional form of the stochastic cost frontier 
yielded similar prediction of cost efficiency. The estimated efficiency of CDLF was 
regressed on the internal characteristics to determine those that are significant 
determinants of performance. Various definitions of firm performance have been used in 
the literature. Cost efficiency is one such measure of the performance of a firm ie how 
well it is doing in terms of achieving its objectives.De Young and Berger (1997) used 
cost efficiency as a measure of efficiency in banking in their study of problem loans in 
Commercial Banks. Hartarska (2007) studied the impact of board size and diversity on 
CDFI performance using cost inefficiency as a measure of performance. 
  11         The average cost efficiency of CDLF estimated by the translog cost function for the 
sample is .42 with minimum and maximum being .027 and .79 respectively and with 
standard error of .18. The averages of cost efficiency estimated from Cobb-Douglas cost 
frontier do not differ markedly. The data reveals that the average age of CDLF in the 
sample is 18 years with a wide range of difference in age from 5 to 44 years in operation. 
Board size as measured by the number of board members also varies from one institution 
to the other with a sample average of about 13.The largest board in the sample has 32 
members while the smallest has 4 members. 
        Two variables that capture board diversity are the proportion of minorities and 
females represented on the board. Of particular importance is the influence of board 
diversity on efficiency of the CDFI. In the sample of 294 CDLFs only 8 of them have 
boards with all members being minorities while 45 have no minority members on their 
board. Representation of females on the boards range from zero to 14.Average female 
representation on all boards in the sample is 32% .There are four boards with the largest 




Tables 2 and 3 present the output from the OLS regression analysis with estimated cost 
efficiency as the regressand.Most important repressors are board size,age,size of CDLF 
(measured by total assets ), board composition (measured by proportion of minorities and 
proportion of females) and other controls. 
 
  125.1 BOARD SIZE AND CDLF EFFICIENCY 
Holding other factors constant, board size has a negative ceteris paribus effect on cost 
efficiency. The effect is neither economically large nor statistically significant at any 
conventional level. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that board size is not a 
significant determinant of efficiency in CDFI Loan Fund Institutions. This supports the 
findings of Hartarska (2007) that board size is not a significant determinant of efficiency 
for CDFI Loan Funds Institutions. The negative effect of board size is a reflection of the 
so-called free-riding concept identified in Lipton and Lorch (1992), Jensen (1993) and 
further confirmed by the studies of the effect of board size in both large and small 
corporate boards (Yermack, 1996; Eisenber, Sungren, and Wells, 1998). 
 
5.2 TOTAL ASSETS AND CDLF EFFICIENCY 
Total assets, a measure of the size of CDFIs and for that matter all firms is estimated to 
have a positive effect on efficiency of CDFIs.A unit increase in the dollar value of total 
assets increases the cost efficiency by 8.55e-10 (Table 2).It seems a negligible effect 
economically but it is very statistically significant at very small alpha levels, suggesting a 
positive association between size and efficiency. This constitutes a refutation of the null 
hypothesis that larger CDLFs are less efficient. This also confirms the findings of 
Gregoire and Oswaldo (2003) that MFIs with the largest assets tend to post higher 
efficiency. 
 
5.3 AGE AND CDLF EFFICIENCY 
Older firms are poor performers at least as the sample results depict. An additional year 
in operation reduces the cost efficiency of a CDFI loan fund by .0043 on average. This is 
  13a large effect. The null hypothesis that older firms are less efficient is thus validated at all 
conventional significance levels. This is perhaps a reflection of the negative effect of 
diminishing returns to scale as the firm grows older.  
 
5.4 EFFECT OF BOARD SIZE AND DIVERSITY ON CDLF EFFICIENCY 
The board diversity variables (Pmin and Pfem) are jointly significant at the 1% level. 
Both variables exhibit a negative impact on efficiency. Individually Pmin is significant 
but Pfem is not. This also confirms the earlier findings by Hartarska (2007) that for 
CDLFs, as the proportion of minorities on the board increases, efficiency decreases. In 
the sample, there are 8 boards with all members being minorities. These 8 CDLFs have 
an average estimated efficiency of .35 and range from .075 minimum efficiency to a 
maximum of .67.The average is lower than the sample average of .42 which gives the 
impression that minority representation on boards decreases efficiency. But one must not 
lose sight of the fact that this sample is not representative in terms of racial or gender 
composition. Moreover, the sample is not large enough which tends to limit any general 
conclusions that might be reached. 
 
5.5 IMPACT OF OTHER VARIABLES 
Other control variables in the regression indicate that equity-asset ratio, capital-asset 
ratio, loan loss reserve and total equity are individually significant determinants of 
efficiency. The equity-asset ratio and capital-asset ratio are positively associated with 
level of efficiency of the firm. 
  14The profit margin and liability-asset ratio are insignificant and negatively 
associated with efficiency. Another variable of interest is the profit motive of the CDLF 
proxied in this study by the dummy, Fp (indicating whether the CDLF is for profit or 
not).This variable tends out to be insignificant. Incidentally, of the 293 observations only 
3 are for-profit while the rest are non-profit. With this, it becomes impossible to uncover 
the ceteris paribus effect of the impact of the profit motive on CDLF efficiency. This may 
explain the insignificance of variable Fp.It’s been suggested by some researchers that 
both for- profit and non-profit organizations aim to minimize their cost of operations. It 
would therefore have been of interest and insightful to see how this motive impacts the 
level of efficiency. The direction of future research could aim at uncovering the ceteris 
paribus effect of the profit motive using a balanced sample of non-profit and for profit 




This paper explores the determinants of cost efficiency of CDLFs via a parametric 
stochastic cost frontier approach. Using a four-year panel data the results of the study 
demonstrates that there is no difference in whether we use a translog or Cobb-Douglas 
functional form, the cost efficiency estimates are consistently the same over the entire 
range of firms considered. 
The main findings of the study are that CDLFs with the largest assets tend to 
exhibit higher efficiency levels. Holding other factors constant, board size is found to 
have a negative though insignificant effect on efficiency. Efficiency also decreases with 
  15proportion of minority representation on the board and age of the CDLF. The study 
identifies that loan loss reserve, total equity, equity-asset ratio, capital-asset ratio are 
significant factors determining the cost efficiency of CDLFs.These findings are 
consistent with the literature. 
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Table 1.Summary statistics 
  Mean             
          
Standard 
deviation       
Minimum  Maximum 
CE      .42    .18  .027  .79 
Age  18.32  7.78  5  44 
Ta      3.11e+07  1.02e+08  102523  1.07e+09 
B S I Z E        12.82    5.32    4  32 
Pmin      .28  .24  0  1 
P f e m        .38  .16  0  .83 
EtaR  .40  .23  -.056  .96 
Equitytidi      1.06e+07  2.61e+07  -183317  2.42e+08 
CaptaR      .82  .17  .14  .99 
LiabtaR   .59  .23  .04  1.06 
LlossR      983343  2370549  0  2.01e+07 
  17Table 2.Results of OLS regression analysis using cost efficiency estimates from translog 
function as dependent variable (standard errors). 
                                      (1)                                     (2)                               (3) 
 
Constant                      .289***    .288***                  .137 
                                                           (.111)      (.067)      (.242) 
Age     -.0043***   -.0038***   -.0043*** 
    (.0012)    (.0011)    (.0012) 
Ta     8.55e-10***   6.93e-10**   6.30e-10** 
        (2.86e-10)             (2.87e-10)     (2.94e-10) 
Bsize        -.00001                   -.00045                  -.0014 
    (.0017)    (.0017)    (.0017) 
Pmin        -.115***                   -.121***    -.130*** 
    (.037)    (.037)    (.037) 
Pfem     -.0069    -.0122    .0075 
    (.057)    (.056)    (.057) 
LlossR     -1.88e-08***   -1.67e-08** 
    (6.26e-09)   (6.47e-09) 
EtaR        .132***                    .141***    .314 
    (.045)    (.044)    (.238) 
Equitytidi      -4.27e-09***    -3.83e-09***                -5.02***  
    (1.22e-09)   (1.13e-09)   (1.12) 
CaptaR        .257***                  .277***                  .264 
    (.056)    (.054)    (.056) 
Pmarg              1.59e-09                 7.54e-09 
       ( 5 . 7 7 e - 0 9 )    ( 5 . 6 2 e - 0 9 )  
LiabtaR                                 .172 
          ( . 2 3 4 )  
F p      . 0 1 9  
    ( . 0 8 7 )  
Observations    289    297    293 
R-squared    .36    .35    .34 
B-P test for Hetero: Chi2=0.00, Prob>0.95 








  18Table 3.Results of OLS regression analysis using cost efficiency estimates from Cobb-
Douglas function as dependent variable (standard errors). 
                                         (1)         (2)                                (3) 
Constant                 .317***                  .294***                             .309*** 
      (.104)      (.063)                  (.065)   
Age      -.0042***    -.0036***                -.0039*** 
      (.0011)      (.001)                  (.0011)   
Ta      1.08e-09***    9.63e-10***               8.38e-10*** 
      (2.68e-10)    (2.71e-10)                             (2.73e-10) 
Bsize      -.00074                     -.0011                             -.0022 
      (.0017)        (.0017)                (.0016)   
Pmin      -.128***                     -.132***              -.143*** 
      (.035)          (.035)                (.035)   
Pfem      -.029        -.036                 -.0158 
      (.054)        (.053)                  (.054)   
LlossR    -2.04e-08***   -1.81e-08***     
   (5.86e-09)   (6.11e-09)     
EtaR      .157***                   .167***              .171*** 
   ( . 0 4 2 2 )     ( . 0 4 2 )                         ( . 0 4 3 )    
Equitytidi    -4.52e-09***     -4.28e-09***             -5.36e-09*** 
   (1.14e-09)   (1.07e-09)            (1.04e-09)   
CaptaR      .245***                 .255***                          .246*** 
   (.053)    (.051)                        (.053)    
Pmarg       2.66e-10 
      ( 5 . 4 5 e - 0 9 )     
  
Fp      -.0056 
     ( . 0 8 2 )       
Observations      289         297            293       
R-squared      .37          .36            .34     
B-P test of Hetero: Chi2=0.23, prob>0.63 
 






  19Table 4.Variable definitions 














Cost Efficiency, estimated from a translog or Cobb-Douglas function 
Number of years CDFI has been operating 
Total Assets 
Board Size 
Proportion of minorities on board 
Proportion of females on board 
Profit margin 
Equity-to-asset-Ratio 
Total equity (dollars) 
Capital-to-asset-Ratio 
Liability-to-asset-Ratio 
Loan loss Reserve 
For profit, a dummy equal to 1 if legally registered as a profit firm 
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